Introduction
• Economists, and more specifically game theorists, typically attribute delays in settlement to incomplete information • Bargainers possess private information about • Bargainers possess private information about factors, causing them to be mutually uncertain about the other side's reservation value • Uncertainty produces impasse because bargainers use costly delays to signal to the other party information about their own reservation value
• This paper identifies a different and relatively simple psychological mechanism as a major cause of bargaining impasse • This is the tendency for parties to arrive at judgments that reflect a self-serving bias that reflect a self-serving bias • self-serving assessments of fairness can promote impasse in at least three ways 1. if negotiators estimate the value of the alternatives to negotiated settlements in self-serving ways, this could rule out any chance of settlement by eliminating the contract zone 1. Introduction 2. if disputants believe that their notion of fairness is impartial and shared by both sides, then they will interpret the other party's aggressive bargaining not as an attempt to get what they perceive of as fair 3. negotiators are strongly averse to settling even slightly 3. negotiators are strongly averse to settling even slightly below the point they view as fair
• The evidence we review shows -the self-serving bias, and the impasses it causes, occurs even when disputants possess identical information -private and incomplete information may not be as critical for non-settlement as is commonly believed
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2. Psychological Research on the SelfServing Bias
• The self-serving bias is evident in the "above average" effect • Ex.
-when married couples estimate the fraction of -when married couples estimate the fraction of various household tasks they are responsible for, their estimates typically add to more than 100% -People also tend to attribute their successes to ability and skill, but their failures to bad luck
• The self-serving bias affects not only individuals' evaluations of themselves, but also of groups they are affiliated with • Ex.
• Ex. 3. An Experimental Investigation: A Texas Tort Case
• We developed a tort case based on a trial that occurred in Texas, in which an injured motorcyclist sued the driver of the automobile that collided with him, requesting $100,000. that collided with him, requesting $100,000.
• Subjects first receive a page explaining the experiment, the sequence of events, rules for negotiating and the costs they face if they failed to reach an agreement
3. An Experimental Investigation: A Texas Tort Case
• Before negotiating, subjects are asked to write down their guesses of what the judge awarded • They are told they will receive a bonus of $1 at the end of the session if their prediction is within $5,000 (plus or minus) of the actual judge's award.
(plus or minus) of the actual judge's award.
• They are also asked what they considered a fair amount for the plaintiff to receive in an out-of-court settlement • Delays in settlement are made costly to the subjects by imposing "court costs" that accumulate in each period in which the subjects fail to settle
• At the beginning of a session, both subjects are paid a fixed fee for participating (for example, $4) and the defendant is given an extra $10.
• $10,000 dollars is equivalent to $1 for the subjects • • • The experiment was designed to test for the effect of the self-serving bias • Since neither party has private information about the judge, • differences in estimates between defendant and plaintiff cannot be attributed to differences in information 3. An Experimental Investigation: A Texas Tort Case
• It is possible, for example, that there is a third factor, • perhaps some element of personality such as aggressiveness, • that causes certain subjects to misestimate the judge • that causes certain subjects to misestimate the judge and to be unwilling to settle • To avoid this problem, we introduced a manipulation to diminish the magnitude of the discrepancy in expectations
• In the control condition -the participants learned whether their role would be defendant or plaintiff before they read the case materials and offered their anonymous assessments materials and offered their anonymous assessments of the judge and a fair settlement
• in the experimental condition -they learned which role they would play after reading the case materials and offering their estimates of the judge and a fair settlement
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• Our prediction was that -the discrepancy between the plaintiffs' and defendants' assessments would be smaller for those who learned their role after reading the case, who learned their role after reading the case, -because, not knowing their role when they read through the case, they would process the information in an unbiased fashion.
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• The experiment was run with -38 public policy students at Carnegie Mellon University -120 law students from the University of Texas -30 business students from the University of Pennsylvania
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• Might other experimental manipulations offer suggestions for practical ways of reducing the discrepancy in the parties' expectations and thus avoid impasse? thus avoid impasse? • Obviously, our experiment that gave subjects their role after reading the case materials has no practical implication, since parties to a dispute usually know their own roles from the outset.
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• experiment with several interventions to "debias" as a way to promote settlement 1. subjects read the self-serving bias after they were 1. subjects read the self-serving bias after they were assigned their roles and read the case • but before recorded their assessments of fairness and their predictions of the judge's decision • However, being informed of the bias had no effect on the discrepancy in the parties' expectations, nor on the likelihood of settlement
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• asked subjects to guess their opponent's prediction of the judge • Our results indicate that informing subjects of the bias made them more realistic about the the bias made them more realistic about the predictions of the other party • However, it did not cause them to modify their own predictions of the judge.
3. An Experimental Investigation: A Texas Tort Case 2. before they negotiated, subjects were instructed to write an essay arguing the opponent's case as convincingly as possible • research suggested that people with better • research suggested that people with better perspective-taking ability resolve disputes more efficiently • This did change the discrepancy in expectations, and in a way that was marginally statistically significant, but opposite to the intended direction • no significant impact on the settlement rate 20091028 18 3. An Experimental Investigation: A Texas Tort Case 3. research in psychology shows that biases diminish when subjects question their own judgment • after being assigned their role and reading the case materials, • Subjects were informed of the self-serving bias and • Subjects were informed of the self-serving bias and told that it could arise from the failure to think about the weaknesses in their own case • They were then asked to list the weaknesses in their own case • The effect of this was to diminish the discrepancy in the parties' expectations about the judge
19
• whether experienced negotiators would succumb to the self-serving bias • we conducted a study to examine the bias and its impact on bargaining in a real-world setting -public school teacher contract negotiations in Pennsylvania -Since 1971, approximately 8 percent of all teacher contract negotiations have ended in a strike, with an average strike duration of 16.4 days.
• hypothesized that -both sides would have self-serving beliefs about which communities were comparable -and that impasses would be more likely as the gap between their beliefs widened.
20091028 20
• surveyed union and school board presidents from all school districts in Pennsylvania
-to obtain a list of districts that they viewed as comparable for purposes of salary negotiations comparable for purposes of salary negotiations -we found that both sides listed about the same number of districts as being comparable (about 4.5) -However, average salary in districts listed by the union was $27,633, while the average salary in districts listed by the board was $26,922. • test for the effect of the self-serving bias on strikes • regression suggests -a district where the average salary of the union's -a district where the average salary of the union's list is $1000 greater than the board's list will be approximately 49 percent more likely to strike
• Experience with bargaining does not seem to inoculate one against the self-serving bias 20091028 22
Reinterpreting Findings from Previous Bargaining Experiments
• Ex -bargained over lottery ($20 vs. $5) -shrinking pie -shrunk at the same rate for both individuals, the rejection rate was only 12% in the first round rate was only 12% in the first round -shrunk at different rates for each subject, the rejection rate was 57% in the first round -consistent with the self-serving bias -subjects whose pies shrank relatively slowly viewed this as justification for requesting a large fraction of the pie -but subjects whose pies shrunk quickly rejected the rate of pie-shrinkage as a criterion for allocating the pie 20091028 23
-ultimatum game -in practice, the modal offer is typically half the pie, and smaller offers are often rejected -rejections in these experiments can be explained by selfserving biases -In one variant of the game, the roles of proposer and -In one variant of the game, the roles of proposer and responder were determined either randomly or by the outcome of a trivia, the winner playing the role of proposer -Offers in the contest condition were lower than in the chance condition, and the rejection rate was substantially higher. -It seems that proposers in the contest condition felt selfservingly entitled to a higher payoff, but responders did not view the contest as relevant to the fair division of the pie 20091028 24
-another variant of the ultimatum game -players earned a known dollar amount if the responder rejected the proposer's ultimatum offer -For example, if the amount to be divided is $10, and, if the offer was rejected, proposers earned $4 and, if the offer was rejected, proposers earned $4 and responders earned $3 -respondents in this situation consistently demanded more than half the "pie," -about half of the offers were rejected -a rate of disagreement much higher than previous ultimatum studies.
